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Captain Francis Messervy, first time captain on the slave ship Ferrers and perhaps overly 
ecstatic after his most recent successes at sea, maneuvered unprotected below deck to inspect his 
newly-purchased Africans.  As he lurched further down into the slave ship, Messervy would 
have seen the sailors whose duty it was to guard against insurrection and the three hundred or 
more Africans that he had recently purchased following a war between two neighboring polities 
near Cetre-Crue.  What Messervy perceived as good fortune, fellow captain William Snelgrave 
perceived as a cause for concern.  Snelgrave noted that controlling “many Negroes of one Town 
and Language” had its inherent risks and these suspicions, borne from his experience as a slave 
ship captain, proved correct a few months later when the news circulating the Guinea coast 
highlighted a large-scale insurrection aboard the Ferrers.  Captains and mariners alike shared 
tales of Africans who “beat out his [Messervy’s] brains with the little Tubs,” and of the ensuing 
battle in which nearly eighty Africans died.2   
Despite perceptions among the British public concerning the transatlantic slave trade, 
slave insurrections such as that on the Ferrers in 1722 occurred quite frequently.  The 
Transatlantic Slave Trade Database (“TASD”) documents twenty-seven slave insurrections 
occurring on British ships during 1713-1743, as well as an additional five instances in which 
Africans attacked British slave ships near the coast—amounting to just over one instance per 
year.  To be sure, the number of reported insurrections would increase as the century went on, in 
part due to an increase in slaving in regions “associated with exceptional levels of revolts or 
shore-based attacks on ships;”3 however, the number of insurrections in the early eighteenth-
                                                 
2
 William Snelgrave, A New Account of Some Parts of Guinea and the Slave-Trade (London: Frank Cass & 
Co. Ltd., 1971), 185-191; Marcus Rediker, The Slave Ship: A Human History (New York: Penguin Books, 2007), 
213, 287; Eric Robert Taylor, If We Must Die: A History of Shipboard Insurrections During the Slave Trade (Ann 
Arbor: Bell & Howell, 2000), 145; Stephanie Smallwood, Saltwater Slavery: A Middle Passage from Africa to 
American Diaspora, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 103-4. 
3
 David Richardson, “Shipboard Revolts, African Authority, and the Atlantic Slave Trade,” William and 
Mary Quarterly (“WMQ”), Vol. 58:1 (Jan., 2001): 77. 
Buckwalter 3 
century was enough to significantly inhibit the profits of slave traders.4  What is more, the 
captains, officers, crew, and financiers of slaving voyages were aware of such insurrections and 
took considerable measures to prevent them.  Captain William Snelgrave in his A New Account 
of Some Parts of Guinea and the Slave-Trade, published in London in 1734, wrote extensively 
about slave shipboard insurrections.  Snelgrave’s autobiographical account of his career as a 
slave ship captain discussed four slave insurrections over a period of less than two decades: the 
Eagle Galley in 1704, the Henry in 1721, the Elizabeth in 1721, and the Ferrers in 1722.5  
Moreover, in response to resistance by enslaved Africans, slave traders had by the early 
eighteenth-century adopted numerous defense mechanisms.  These included fortified settlements, 
forts and castles scattered along the African coast, increased crew members aboard ships and 
guarding forts, and the barricado, a wooden barrier notorious on slave ships for providing a 
barrier to protect seamen from rebelling slaves.6  The public, too, had access to descriptions of 
insurrections at sea in their papers, including an incident in which “the Negro Slaves rose, killed 
the Master and eight Men, leaving alive only his Deponent and two Boys, of all the crew.”7  
Most importantly, those who wrote about slave insurrections, including Royal Navy surgeon 
John Atkins, emphasized the importance of limiting slave insurrections, and suggested methods 
of prevention.  In fact, Atkins soberly notes in his reflections: “there has not been wanting 
                                                 
4
 David Eltis, David Richardson, and Stephen Behrendt estimate that nearly one in ten slaving vessels from 
1698-1807 experienced a slave revolt; Stephen Behrendt, David Eltis, & David Richardson, “The Costs of Coercion: 
African Agency in the Pre-Modern Atlantic World,” Economic History Review 54-3 (2001), 456. 
5
 William Snelgrave, A New Account of Some Parts of Guinea and the Slave-Trade, (London: Frank Cass & 
Co. Ltd., 1971), 165, 168, 174, 185. 
6
 Rediker, The Slave Ship, 70.  Pretexat Oursel’s lithograph “Transport des Negres dans le Colonies,” 
depicts a barricado on a French slave ship. The Slave Ship, Illustration insert, p. 5; Behrendt, Eltis, & Richardson, 
“The Costs of Coercion,” pp. 467-9. 
7
 Weekly Register, Saturday, October 17, 1730, Issue 28, p. 104, British Periodicals, 
http://britishperiodicals.chadwyck.com/home.do. 
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Examples of rising and killing a Ship’s Company…but once or twice is enough to Shew, a 
Master’s Care and Dilligence should never be over till the delivery of them.”8   
While many eighteenth-century slave ship captains may have been diligent about 
preventing slave insurrections, the frequency, impact, and transparency of slave insurrections 
have evaded the eyes—and pens—of historians until the last decade or so.  This should be no 
surprise as British government papers, a significant source for historians studying the slave trade, 
are largely silent on the issue.  Undeterred by this, historians Eric Taylor, David Richardson, 
David Eltis, Stephen Behrendt, Joseph Inikori and Stephanie Smallwood have begun to tackle 
the issue of slave shipboard insurrections directly.9  Moreover, the newest generations of 
historians have shifted away from European-centered studies of the slave trade, opting instead 
for inquiries that focus on the victims, thus introducing a new perspective on the slave trade.10  
For instance, historian Eric Taylor has carefully examined the frequency, magnitude, and success 
of shipboard insurrections, while David Richardson and Joseph Inikori have assessed the 
economic effects of such insurrections and Stephanie Smallwood has provided a nuanced 
analysis of women’s roles in slave ship insurrections.  Lost in this maelstrom of historical 
analysis is the British government’s reaction to slave shipboard insurrections and attacks by 
Africans on the coast and how, if at all, the status of race and anti-slavery in the early eighteenth-
century Britain relates to this silence.  
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The British government’s limited involvement in controlling shipboard insurrections is 
anomalous considering these incidents directly threatened the profits of influential British 
merchants and politicians.  Instead, the British government discussed taxing slaves, financing 
forts and castles on the coast of Africa, preventing insurrections in its Caribbean and American 
colonies, suppressing piracy, and competing with the other European powers.  In each of these 
instances, we see the British government concerning itself with issues that inhibited the profits of 
its increasingly influential slave trade financiers.  Managing duties, financing forts, preventing 
piracy, and competing with Europeans all helped decrease the risk of shipping slaves while 
containing landed slave insurrections in the Americas helped preserve the livelihood of British 
colonial settlements (and the profits they generated).  What emerges is a situation in which the 
British government failed to investigate shipboard insurrections while simultaneously 
investigating the multiple enemies, both at home and abroad, that made similar attempts to lessen 
the profits of the slave trade.  In the end, the British government’s silence on the issue of 
shipboard insurrections reflects a silence in the greater society on the issue of slavery and the 
slave trade.  To be sure, while some individuals rebuked the slave trade in the early eighteenth-
century, they limited themselves to moral criticisms, rather than acting on their written assertions 
or questioning the Empire’s policies.11  While accounts of these instances were made available to 
the public, the lack of concern given by the British government reflects an inability by early 
eighteenth-century Britons to make meaningful enquiries into the slave trade. 
The Slave trade and the Early Eighteenth-century 
 Marcus Rediker, reflecting on sailor-led mutinies in the eighteenth-century, defines 
mutiny as any “collective effort, planned or spontaneous, to curtail the captain’s power and, in 
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the most extreme case, to seize control of the ship.”12  While Rediker refers to white sailors (of a 
diverse number of trades) and their attempts to resist the rigid class distinctions of the maritime 
world, his definition in many ways parallels attempts by Africans to resist the slave trade.  
Surely, both seamen mutinies and slave insurrections were collective efforts.  Occasionally, 
slaves planned their acts of insurrection, but often times, insurrections grew spontaneously out of 
unpredictable windows of opportunity.  Seaman mutineers desired to seize power from their 
captain, as did African insurrectionists, one important difference being that Africans desired a 
redistribution of power based on race while seamen desired one based on class.13  With this in 
mind, slave shipboard insurrections can be crudely defined as any collective effort by Africans, 
planned or spontaneous, to resist the power of Europeans or take control of slave ships.   
Similar instances, albeit more ambiguous, involve free coastal African attacking 
Europeans slave ships.  Soon after February 10, 1731, when the Ruby sailed from James Fort to 
the Gold Coast, she was “attacked by the natives and Captain Colwell was killed.”14  Often 
referred to as being “cut off,” attacks like the one experienced by the Ruby can be loosely 
defined as any collective attempt by Africans to violently resist the Europeans involved in the 
slave trade.   
Unfortunately, the historical record falls short of providing complete and accurate details 
for every instance of being “cut off.”  In the case of the Ruby, Francis Moore (a geographer 
employed as a writer, factor, and eventually chief factor of the Royal African Company (“RAC”) 
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at James Fort) considered the events that took place an attack by native Africans; however, the 
New England Weekly Journal on March 20, 1732 noted that the captain was “purchasing 
Negroes” when they “finding an opportunity rose on the ship’s company, kill’d Capt. Collwell, 
and run the ship on shore.”15  One possible explanation for this discrepancy holds that the New 
England Weekly Journal and Francis Moore had conflicting definitions of “natives” and 
“slaves.”16  Whether this is true or false, however, does not erase the ambiguity of many 
accounts.  Instead, these conflicting accounts are emblematic of the ambiguity surrounding 
instances of being “cut off.”  However, because the government similarly ignored these instances 
and because of the ambiguity surrounding these attacks, shipboard attacks and attacks by coastal 
Africans are combined for the purposes of this study.  
The early eighteenth-century provides an effective arena for examining shipboard 
insurrections.  Broadly, the slave trade in this period was increasing exponentially and, although 
it was a shadow of what it would later become, the slave trade was already an integral part of 
British economic and political life.17  Additionally, 1713 brought the Treaty of Utrecht that 
ended the hostilities of the War of Spanish Succession, ushering in a quarter-century of relatively 
undisrupted peace—a rarity for eighteenth-century Britain.  On the surface, the coming of peace 
would appear to liberate Parliament from issues of war and international competition, allowing 
other domestic and imperial issues to be discussed.  In addition, one year prior to the treaty 
Parliament ended RAC’s monopolist control over the trade.   In terms of the slave trade, this 
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meant that a Parliamentary “vacuum,” in the words of Christopher L. Brown, was created.18  
Furthermore, with the burden of the free trade debates lifted, it would appear again that 
Parliament would have more opportunities to discuss the nature, effects, and prevention of 
shipboard insurrections.  Put another way, lacking the immediate threats of war and issues of 
how the slave trade would be run, the years after the Treaty of Utrecht appear to open new doors 
for Parliament to deal with threats to the slave trade, such as shipboard insurrections.   
Peace, however, lacked staying power.  By 1739 Britain was again at war with Spain and, 
later, involved in the War of Austrian Succession.  Yet the War of Jenkins’ Ear (1739-1743) 
provides an important glimpse into the slave trade and the issues surrounding it during times of 
war.  Being limited in nature (before it blossomed into the War of Austrian Succession) and at 
least partly growing out of international competition with the British and Spanish in the 1730s, 
the War of Jenkins’ Ear therefore allows for a comparison between Parliamentary enquiries into 
shipboard insurrections during both war and peace.   
In contrast, traditional studies of the slave trade and its abolition have focused on the last 
half of the eighteenth-century or later.  There are a number of reasons for this, most notably, the 
fact that the 1720s and 1730s are some of the least documented decades of the slave trade.  
However, most historians relish a good challenge, so the lack of documentation does not fully 
explain the lack of historiographical emphasis.  More importantly is the lack of a popular, 
sustained, and well-organized enquiry into the slave trade.  In contrast, the decades surrounding 
1700 saw organized debate concerning the organizational nature of the slave trade and the latter 
eighteenth-century saw the organization of the abolition movement.  By this overview, the period 
1713-43 seems like a period in which the slave trade was of little relevance to British authorities.   
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Yet the slave trade did matter.  And it mattered to more people than just the Jamaican 
merchant who wrote an MP in 1709, using words like “barbarous” and “inhuman” to describe the 
“African trade.”  True, the merchant was arguing in favor of increasing the productivity of the 
slave trade, but he also argued that “it has never yet throve, nor do I believe ever will, till ‘tis 
manag’d with more Justice and Humanity.”19  Similarly, William Snelgrave and a host of other 
captains and sailors wrote about the slave trade and the inherent dangers which threatened its 
well-being and profitability, including slave insurrections, which in many cases, “occasioned a 
terrible Destruction.”20  Moreover, historian Christopher L. Brown notes that “Anti-slavery 
sentiment did circulate in the early eighteenth-century,” while conceding that “organized efforts 
to abolish the slave system would not develop until much later,” a statement echoed by English 
professor Philip Gould.21  As these accounts suggest, the burgeoning slave trade of the early 
eighteenth-century, despite Westminster’s inattention and the lack of organized movements 
dedicated to its abolition, played a pivotal role in British society.  Thus, the early eighteenth-
century, rather than being a barren historical period in terms of the slave trade, may prove to be 
the best place to examine the relationship between how both government officials and 
individuals working on slave ships regarded the threats that accompanied the slave trade. 
The volume of the British slave trade in the early eighteenth-century experienced many 
hills and valleys.  The TASD identifies 2,053 British slave ships during the period 1713-43—an 
average of 68.4 ships each year.  When broken into smaller periods (1713-1715, then five 
successive five year periods followed by 1741-1743), we uncover that the late 1720s and the late 
                                                 
19
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1730s experienced the highest yearly averages, with 76.6/year and 80.8/year respectively.  On 
the other hand, the years 1713-1715 reveal that an average of only thirty-two slave ships sailed 
each year.22  Taking into account the two years prior to 1713 and the years after 1739, the data 
suggests that war had at least some effect on the volume of the slave trade.  Overall, the number 
of embarked slaves accelerated significantly after 1713, slowed from 1715 until 1718, and 
slowed again significantly in the early 1720s.  A short boom in 1724-1726 was followed by 
another shrink in volume, which in turn was followed by a sharp rise in 1729-31.  1736-38 
revealed another sharp increase, followed by a general decrease after war broke out (with the 
exception of 1741, which ironically saw one of the highest single-year figures).  In all, the 
volume of the slave trade during this period appears to be one characterized by alternating 2-4 
year periods of increase and decline.  Analyzing the cause of these periods is problematic—at the 
very least, insufficient record keeping during this period renders it impossible to gain an accurate 
figure on the number of ships sailed or slaves embarked.  Moreover, threats from other European 
powers, pirates, and natural disasters figure prominently into the number of slave embarked each 
year.  With this in mind, however, the average recorded number of slaves embarked during the 
last four years prior to war in 1739 indicates that nearly 26,000 slaves were transported each year 
compared to a paltry 15,000 per year during the first four years of our period, showing 
significant increase in slave trading during the early eighteenth-century. 
Detailing Shipboard Insurrections 
The TASD notes nineteen instances of slave shipboard insurrection and five instances of 
ships being “cut off” between 1713 and 1743.  An additional nine instances of slave shipboard 
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insurrection have been found in British and colonial newspapers, as well as in Eric Taylor’s If 
We Must Die: the Queen Caroline (1728), Restoration (1729), Ann (1729), Cape Coast (1721), 
Dove (1733), Princess Caroline (1737), Martha (1725), Dolphin (1735), and George (1727).23  
In total, thirty-three instances of shipboard insurrections or attacks by coastal Africans have been 
uncovered by contemporary research, meaning that 1.6% of British slave ships during our period 
experienced a recorded slave insurrection or attack by coastal Africans—a figure that 
corresponds with “The Costs of Coercion,” a collaborative effort by David Eltis, David 
Richardson, and Stephen Behrendt, which estimated the economic effects of insurrections.  
However, in their estimation, they note that much of the data available concerning specific 
voyages (TASD) comes from port and financial records—records which “are biased against 
information about what happened during the voyage itself, particularly if the voyage was 
terminated prematurely.”24  Similarly, as historian Eric Taylor has pointed out, incidents of slave 
shipboard insurrection likely went underreported.25  This is not surprising.  In a world where 
sailors made between 77-101% less than their superiors, ship captains added to these benefits by 
enjoying near authoritarian rule over their inferiors (certainly more power than they would have 
in Britain).26  Captains, therefore, had a vested interest in protecting their reputation.  For many, 
this may have included covering up incidents of ship insurrection.  While agents in the Atlantic 
world as well as ship captains often relayed information back to London concerning other ships 
(particularly if the ship was owned by the Royal African Company), agents of correspondence 
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were sparse while at sea.  Under these circumstances, successful—or unsuccessful but non-
deadly—slave insurrections might never be reported.  In all, any concrete figures gathered by 
historians on slave ship insurrections can never be fully accurate.  Despite these murky waters, 
Behrendt, Eltis, and Richardson hazard a guess at the true percentage of slave shipboard 
insurrections.  They postulate that, based on more detailed records taken by officials at Nantes 
from 1715-1777 which include accounts of entire voyages, the figure is likely closer to 10% than 
2%.27  What is accurate, therefore, is the prevalence of slave insurrections on British slave ships 
in the early eighteenth-century. 
If slave insurrections occurred on nearly one in ten slave ships, where then did they 
occur?  For hundreds of years, ship captains and historians have concluded that insurrections 
were most likely to occur near the African coast, with sights of their homeland propelling 
Africans into insurrection.  While discussing the process of enslavement, Snelgrave notes that he 
would, “couple the…men together with irons…and soon after we have sail’d from the 
coast…undo…irons.”28  The rationale behind these actions lay in the contemporary beliefs 
concerning when slaves would rebel.  Additionally, Francis Moore advised that, “all the Time he 
[the captain] lied there [on the coast of Africa] he runs the Hazard of the Sickness and Rebellion 
of those Slaves he already has, they being apter to rise in a Harbour than when out at Sea,” 
echoing the words of John Atkins, who asserts that revolts occurred at sea “not so often as on the 
coast.”29  In response, ship captains often rushed their slaving procedures to prevent the 
“increased” risk of mutiny near the coast of Africa.30  In the face of such convincing assessments 
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of the slave trade, recent historians have differed on the issue.  Historian Eric Taylor has 
emphasized that reduced manpower near the coast, both due to sickness and European activity on 
the coast of Africa, led slave ships to become increasingly susceptible to rebellion.31  Others 
have disagreed.  David Richardson notes that slave ships often spent nearly twice as much time 
on the coast than at sea, providing a possible explanation the centuries-old notion that 
insurrections occurred more frequently near the coast.32 
Another dimension of the location of slave shipboard insurrections manifests itself in the 
ethnicity of Africans involved in revolts.  After reflecting on his many decades of service in the 
slave trade, Snelgrave concluded that, “sometimes we meet with stout stubborn people amongst 
them [Africans]…and these are generally some of the Coromantines, a nation of the Gold 
Coast.”33  Snelgrave met these particular Coromantines in 1721, when they were enslaved on the 
ship Henry—a ship on which they later revolted.  Snelgrave further pondered the ethnicities of 
revolting Africans when he conversed with Captain Messervy, the novice captain of the slave 
ship Ferrers in 1721.  Noticing Messervy’s naiveté in the region, Snelgrave “took the liberty to 
observe to him, ‘That as he had on board so many Negroes of one Town and Language, it 
required the utmost Care and Management to keep them from mutinying.’”34  Moreover, John 
Atkins hints at the magnitude of ethnicity and location, noting that “Slaves differ in their 
goodness, those from the Gold Coast are accounted best…an Angolan negro is a proverb for 
worthlessness.”35  Exactly why the Angolans were described as worthless is uncertain; however, 
with Atkins’ previous experience with slave insurrections, it is possible that their tendency to 
rebel affected their worth.  Further concerns for the slaves’ origins are manifest in the Royal 
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African Company: Committee Report on the State of the Trade, which reflects a new energy 
brought into the Company by the Duke of Chandos.  The report calls for, among other things, 
thorough inquiries into the societies in which various slaves were acquired from.  More 
specifically, it advises factors to “make as strict and enquiry as possibly to find out what sort of 
country they came from…What form of Government they have?...how many fighting Men their 
Armys generally Speaking Consist of…Their manner of making Slaves?”36  Once again, while 
these questions fail to explicitly connect insurrections with specific African ethnicities, the 
RAC’s increased interest different African cultures reflect a desire to better understand the 
behavior of Africans, with the ultimate purpose of preventing insurrections and the “better 
regulation of the Trade, and the Supplying the plantations with Negroes at more easy and 
reasonable rates.”37   
This interest, from both a personal and economic perspective, in the rebellious nature of 
various African ethnic groups represents the subject of David Richardson’s “Shipboard Revolts, 
African Authority, and the Transatlantic Slave Trade.”  Richardson articulates that many slave 
ship captains believed the location of slaving significant; “European shippers of slaves believed 
that members of some ethnic groups were more prone to rebel than others.”38  While cautioning 
that his research is tentative, Richardson postulates that the breakdown of political economies 
may influence the rebelliousness of Africans toward their European captors.  Specifically, his 
analysis of the slaving activities and politics of the Senegambia region suggest that increased 
slave trading may have contributed to “a breakdown of political authority,” which induced 
groups within Senegambian society to lash out against slave ships.39  These assertions remain 
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tentative; however, they nonetheless underline one of the key features of slave shipboard 
insurrections: regional differentiation.   
In addition to location of the ship and ethnicity of its slaves, ship captains and modern 
historians alike have desired knowledge of the specific circumstances of rebellion.  Eric Taylor 
supplies the most comprehensive assessment of these circumstances.40  To begin, attacks from 
pirates or other warships could provide enough of a distraction for slaves to revolt.  In the case of 
the Elizabeth in 1721, Snelgrave notes that the Captain and Mate were dead and the ship, “had 
afterwards been taken to Cape Lahoe…by Roberts the Pirate,” until order was finally restored to 
the second mate.41  Realizing that this turbulent course of events could lead to rebellion, 
Snelgrave attempted to force his way with the new captain, suggesting that he hand over all his 
slaves to Snelgrave.  Fearing a mutiny from his sailors, the new captain refused Snelgrave’s 
advice.  Mutiny would come, however, but from slaves rather than seamen.  Snelgrave’s account 
of the Elizabeth thus illustrates that political instability, brought on by skirmishes with pirates or 
other European ships, could incite a group of slaves to rebel.  
Attacks from pirates and warships were not the only forces that could interfere with the 
political stability of a slave ship.  Bad weather, which often forced sailors on deck to navigate 
and repair damage, could provide a sufficient distraction to incite to a revolt.  In addition, slaves 
often took advantage of a calm night to occasion a revolt.  An article in the Boston Gazette on 
November 8, 1725 describes the ship Martha, whose “Negroes had form’d a Design to surprise 
the Crew in the Night Time.”42  Moreover, many slaves took advantage of the relaxed 
atmosphere at mealtimes to revolt.  On the Ferrers in 1721, the slaves rose while eating, using 
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“little Tubs” that held the slaves’ food to assault the sailors.43  This incident speaks to the 
dangerous nature of mealtimes; slaves were not only unchained and congregated together, but 
given instruments that could be used as weapons as well.   
Despite the plethora of precautions taken by ship captains, their crew, and the owners of 
slave ships, negligence on the part of the captain and crew of the ship hastened numerous ship 
insurrections.  In fact, historian Eric Taylor contends that crew negligence the most common 
factor in slave shipboard insurrections.  On the Ann and Pricilla in 1716, the crew, forgetting 
that they left pieces of wood lying on the deck, brought slaves on deck to hoist the vessel’s boat 
near Gambia.  The slaves, taking advantage of their situation, used the pieces of wood to kill the 
captain, Richard Sayers, and take control of the ship.44  Five years later, aboard the Cape Coast 
near Annamaboe, slaves took advantage of Captain Wilson venturing ashore to kill a seaman and 
a boy, all while running the ship ashore.  Of the 17 slaves who escaped, 10 were caught by locals 
and returned to British Officials.  Moreover, in a letter from Cape Coast Castle to London, agents 
criticized the Captain’s foolishness, declaring that “it would be a very unaccountable history that 
Thirteen men & four boys Slaves should attempt to rise upon Seven White Men was it not that it 
seems they were all out of Irons by ye Master’s orders.”45   
William Snelgrave expressed similar criticisms of captains’ relaxed attitude toward 
guarding slaves.  Reflecting on the instance aboard the Elizabeth, Snelgrave recalls advising the 
captain “not to rely on the Friendship of the Slaves,” warning that he would “have reason to 
repent of when too late.”46  Additionally, commenting on the incident aboard the Ferrers, 
Snelgrave assigns blame to the captain, “who by his over-care, and too great kindness to the 
                                                 
43
 Snelgrave, A New Account of Guinea,185-191.  
44
 Taylor, If We Must Die, 117. 
45
 “CCC to London, 30 September 1721,” T70/7 ff. 30-31v, British History Online (“BHO”), 
http://www.british-history.ac.uk/ 
46
 Donnan, Documents Illustrative: Volume II, 357. 
Buckwalter 17 
Negroes on board his Ship, was destroyed by them.”47  In short, the captain’s lax procedures, 
absence from the ship, and “over-care” toward slaves all commonly led to slave shipboard 
insurrections. 
While relaxed rule of a ship could bring cause for rebellion, attempts to assert excessive 
control over the slaves could similarly cause revolt.  Snelgrave sums up this threat, announcing 
“These mutinies are generally occasioned by the Sailors ill usage of these poor people.”  In order 
to prevent mutinies, Snelgrave declared it “my principle care, to have the Negroes on board my 
ship kindly used.”  Snelgrave does not end there, using terms like “humanity” and “tenderness” 
to evoke a sense of benevolent rule of these “poor people.”48  Likewise, rumors frequently spread 
through the slaves’ quarters about how far their white masters were likely to take their violent 
control.  To be sure, some slaves suspected that they may be eaten by whites, a fear which could 
propel slaves to rebellion.  A New and Accurate Description of the Coast of Guinea authored by 
William Bosman, chief factor at the Dutch castle of St. George d’Elmina, describes slaves who, 
“resolve and agree together to run away from the ship, kill the Europeans, and set the Vessel a-
shore.”  The motivation, according to Bosman, was “to free themselves from being our food.”49  
Moreover, Captain Japhet Byrd of the Prince of Orange informs readers of the Boston Weekly 
News Letter of an attempted insurrection on board his ship, which was caused by “one of their 
Countrymen, who come on board and in a joking manner told the Slaves that they were first to 
have their Eyes put out, and then to be eaten.”50  These “nonsensical Falsities,” as Byrd terms 
them, emphasize the ability for preemptive strikes by the slaves if they perceived an imminent 
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threat to their safety.  Moreover, these fears further emphasize the cycle of violence 
characteristic of the slave trade.   
Explaining attacks by coastal Africans is a slightly more complicated problem to assess.  
Because these attacks were often planned on land, they tend to reflect personal issues and 
commercial disagreements.  For example, Captain Thomas Stoneham, a separate trader from 
London and captain of the John and Anne, ventured ashore in 1730 and was “seized by the 
Natives, for anchoring at the Port of Gillyfree, and not paying his Customs.”51  Moreover, the 
Ruby, discussed earlier, had similar problems with natives (although the exact meaning of 
“natives” in the account is somewhat unclear), who erupted to kill Captain Colwell.   
What is more certain, however, is that slaves aboard slave ships often revolted due to 
their desire for freedom.  In their quest, nearly one quarter of slave insurrections resulted in 
freedom for at least one slave, according to historian Eric Taylor.52  In 1729, the slaves aboard 
the Clare Galley revolted near the Gold Coast and took control of the gunpowder and firearms.  
This was enough to convince the captain and crew that defeat was inevitable, ultimately forcing 
them to flea in a longboat.  Exactly what occurred after this is subject to debate, however, we do 
know that some slaves found the freedom they were looking for and that the ship was eventually 
blown up.53   
Each of these possible explanations of slave shipboard insurrections—desiring freedom, 
exacting personal, political, or commercial revenge, taking advantage of the time, location, or 
relaxed control—fails to acknowledge the elephant in the room: the violent nature of the slave 
trade system.  To be sure, the violence employed by Europeans to buttress the slave trade system 
provides the clearest explanation for the violence employed by Africans in their attempts to 
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destroy the slave trade system.  Arguably the best evidence to support this claim comes not from 
instances of slave insurrection but from methods employed by Africans on shore to resist the 
slave trade.  The Balanta people migrated from the hinterland to the coast to escape the grasp of 
the Muslim slave trade, where the marshland terrain and coastal diseases served as a defense.  
Similarly, Tabancas, or high-walled villages were built by many African societies to resist the 
slave trade.54  Historian John Oriji identifies a number of measures of resistance, including 
poisoning the food, water, and wine of slave traders, building walled cities, engaging in armed 
combat, erecting elaborate road blocks, and banding together in common defense.55  
Additionally, Sylvaine A. Diouf mentions panyarring (attacking white slave ships and, in some 
cases, kidnapping its inhabitants) as one attempt that Africans used to secure control of a ship or 
to retrieve an enslaved family member.56   
As these examples show, Africans responded similarly to a variety of different 
encroachments.  They fortified their cities, poisoned food, and engaged in armed combat to 
discourage not only European, but African and Muslim slave traders as well.  In short, the 
commonality in each of these instances is the encroachments and violence of the slave trade, not 
the other factors described above.  True, acts of slave shipboard insurrections could depend on 
issues such as the time, the location, and the presence—or absence—of Europeans, but the 
underlying cause of rebellion was the violence of the slave trade system, not the immediate 
factors preceding each act.   
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With this in mind, slave shipboard insurrections could end any number of ways.  The 
most common outcome for slave shipboard insurrections was a failure to take control of the ship.  
The Sylvia Galley (1715), Robert (1721), Elizabeth (1721), Ruby (1723), Industry (1729), and 
countless others suffered this fate.  On the Industry, a slave woman was found attempting to 
smuggle gun powder and ammunition through a small hole in the wall separating the men’s and 
women’s quarters.  After her capture, the captain, James Williamson, decided that, because she 
was worth less on the market, she would be made an example of.  In the end, the woman was 
shot multiple times and dropped into the sea.57  Eight years earlier, on the Elizabeth, William 
Snelgrave gathered the captains of nearby slave ships together for a conference.  The council of 
slave ship captains was to decide on the fate of a slave who confessed to an insurrection and 
murder of the ship’s cooper.  The captains decided that Snelgrave should “put him to death; 
arguing, ‘That Blood required Blood, by all Laws both divine and human.’”  Snelgrave noted 
that the other captains thought “this would in all probability prevent future Mischiefs.”  In 
accordance with their decision, Snelgrave allowed “all their Negroes upon Deck at the time of 
Execution,” at which time the slave was beheaded and thrown overboard.58     
A much more gruesome scene occurred on the Robert in 1721.  A local African ruler by 
the name of Captain Tomba gathered together a group of villagers and began harassing those 
who cooperated with European slave traders.  In response, John Leadstine, the European in 
charge of the factory at Sierra Leone, captured Tomba and sold him to Captain Richard Harding.  
Tomba then convinced one male and one female slave to accompany him in his attempt to seize 
power of the ship.  Their plot failed.  Harding now had to decide how to handle this “tall, strong, 
defiant man.”  After some deliberation and citing the slave’s potential economic value, Harding 
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chose to spare Tomba.  Moreover, he chose three other slaves to punish, which he did by killing 
the first and feeding him to the other two.59  Such ghastly displays of violence often followed 
unsuccessful attempts to gain control of the ship. 
Slave insurrections occasionally ended in the complete destruction of the slave ship.  For 
example, the Mary sailed in the Gambia River on September 4, 1742, when Captain Nathaniel 
Roberts and his crew of twenty-three men were killed in a slave insurrection that resulted in 
freedom for the slaves and left the ship entirely destroyed.60  Additionally, slaves aboard the 
Dolphin revolted in 1735 off the coast of Africa.  Shortly after, the ship exploded resulting in 
death for everyone on board.61  Astonishingly, seven crew members survived the 1713 explosion 
of the Victorious Anne near Cape Coast after her slaves rose in rebellion.62  In all, there are four 
cases in which slave insurrections led to the destruction of the ship in our period.  By these 
numbers—which are admittedly incomplete—we can surmise that over one in ten slave 
shipboard insurrections led to the complete destruction of the ship. 
In spite of this, not all insurrections led to failure.  In fact, as noted earlier, Eric Taylor 
estimates that nearly one-quarter of insurrections resulted in freedom for at least one slave; 
however, not all successes were similar.63  In an August 28, 1717 letter from Drewry Ottley to 
William Coleman, Ottely gives a “melancholy acc’t of that unfortunate ship,” the Anne Galley.  
The letter notes Captain Benjamin Clarke’s untimely death in June 1717 in the Gambia River.  
Taking advantage, the slaves rose in July, resulting in the deaths of all but sixteen slaves.  
Nonetheless, six slaves later managed to jump overboard and escape to freedom near the island 
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of Montserrat.64  On September 6, 1721, slaves aboard the Cape Coast took advantage of Captain 
Wilson’s absence, running the sloop ashore and escaping to Annamaboe.  For seven of the 
seventeen who left the ship alive, freedom was gained, while the remaining ten were 
recaptured.65  Running a ship ashore after wresting control from the whites represents another 
common outcome of slave shipboard insurrections.  Just as slaves occasionally gained control of 
a vessel, they could subsequently lose control of the vessel.  While little is known about the 
insurrection aboard the Expedition in 1739, we do know that slave deaths were substantial, and 
that the ship was eventually re-captured by the crew near Gambia.66  Thus, declaring slaves the 
“victor” in their rebellions would give little indication of events that transpired.  Even when 
slaves did gain complete control of the vessel, many could have died during the struggle or could 
be subsequently re-captured by surviving crew or local Africans. 
In reality, these examples roughly canvass the spectrum of possible outcomes of slave 
shipboard insurrections.  For contemporary historians, however, the picture is less precise.  To be 
sure, insufficient information remains a reality for a number of known instances of slave 
shipboard insurrections.  For example, on August 30, 1739, slaves aboard the Princess Carolina 
revolted, killing three members of the crew, however, the subsequent fate of the remaining 
slaves, crew, and captain are unknown.67  Moreover, Captain Richard Sayers of the Anne and 
Pricilla (1716) allowed slaves on deck to assist the crew.  After finding pieces of stray wood 
lying on the deck, they rose, killed the captain, and took control of the vessel.  Even though the 
ship was near Gambia (and not in the middle passage), the fate of the crew, the ship, the slaves, 
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and their endeavors for freedom are unknown.68  So, while slave insurrections resulted in myriad 
outcomes, the fates of many confirmed cases of slave insurrections are shrouded in mystery. 
Major Publications and Slave Shipboard Insurrections 
 As we have seen, slave shipboard insurrections came in a number of forms, resulted from 
a multitude of situations, and had a variety of diverse outcomes.  This is evident from the 
accounts of slave shipboard insurrections by various Britons in their personal correspondence, 
official business correspondence, publications, and periodicals discussed above. However, these 
few examples do not represent fully the entire scope of knowledge that Britons received between 
1713 and 1743 concerning insurrections.  For that, we look deeper into the world of publications, 
newspaper articles, and RAC and South Sea Company (”SSC”) correspondence. 
 The most detailed accounts and discussions of slave shipboard insurrections can be found 
in major publications by men involved in the slave trade.  While they provide detail and 
specificity, these reports are few in number, with only three major published works during 1713-
1743 that deal at length with slave shipboard insurrections.  Arguably the most detailed, William 
Snelgrave’s A New Account of Some Parts of Guinea and the Slave-Trade, was published in 
1734 and has proved immensely useful for slave trade historians, both in the eighteenth-century 
and the twenty-first century.69  The son of a slave ship captain, Snelgrave enjoyed relative 
success in his slave trading ventures—surviving nearly three decades in the violent world of 
slave trading and being alive and well enough to publish his accounts counts.  A separate trader, 
Snelgrave seemed to be popular among his peers and merchants in London (he dedicated his 
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work to the London Merchants).  Even if Snelgrave was not popular, he thought he was—a fact 
that becomes abundantly evident throughout his work.   
 A New Account of Guinea takes the reader on an epic journey through the violence of the 
transatlantic slave trade.  Snelgrave’s account begins with his first voyage to Old Calabar in 
1704, details his service on the Anne in the last year of the War of Spanish Succession, followed 
by his capture by pirates in 1718, and describes his trading at Whydah in 1727 and 1729.70 
Snelgrave incorporates a detailed discussion of slave mutinies, including methods of prevention.  
Additionally, Snelgrave places mutinies at the center of his discussion by providing a small 
anecdote as a preface to his accounts.  He recalls an instance while on the coast of Africa in 
which, appalled by the Africans’ attempt to sacrifice a small child, he buys the child.  Upon 
returning to his ship, the ship captain notices that one of his slaves is the child’s mother.  The 
mother—and the rest of the slaves—see this reuniting as an act of goodwill on the part of 
Snelgrave, who notes that following this act, the slaves held “a good notion of white men; so that 
we had no Mutiny in our ship, during the whole voyage.”71  By initiating his work with this tale, 
Snelgrave embraces the centrality of rebellion (and the importance of preventing rebellion) in the 
life of the slave ship captain.  
 Following a general discussion of slave trading ventures, Snelgrave arrives on the topic 
of mutiny once again, declaring that slave mutinies were generally brought on by “ill usage” of 
the slaves.  In contrast, treating the slaves with “humanity and tenderness” would limit the 
possibility of mutinies as well as preserve the health of slaves.72  Snelgrave’s first mutiny on the 
Eagle in 1704 seems quite unsurprising to the contemporary historian.  The ship contained less 
than ten healthy crewmen, many of which were on shore gathering wood.  At supper, the slaves 
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seized the opportunity to revolt.  Ultimately, the revolt ended in failure, mainly due to the 
“Officers care in keep a good watch.”73   
 Tenderness and humanity would not always suffice, however.  Occasionally, Snelgrave 
would meet with “stout stubborn people,” who despite “being kindly used” “nevertheless 
mutinied.”  This was the case in 1721 aboard the slave ship Henry.  When the crew discovered 
slaves attempting to mutiny, Snelgrave opted for leniency, agreeing not to punish them.  A few 
days later, however, one of the ship’s linguists (an African employed by Snelgrave to serve as a 
connection between the slaves and the crew, sometimes referred to as a ‘Grometto’) unearthed 
another plot to revolt.  After this, Snelgrave admits “uneasiness, for I knew several voyages had 
proved unsuccessful by Mutinies.”74   
 Snelgrave’s accounts of mutinies aboard the Elizabeth and Ferrers have already been 
detailed to some degree; however it would prove helpful to revisit them briefly.  In the case of 
the Elizabeth, Snelgrave observed the turbulent power struggle between Captain Thompson, the 
pirate Roberts, the Second Mate, and Snelgrave himself.  In short, after the pirates’ realization 
that Captain Thompson was a just captain, a debate ensues regarding who should be awarded 
control of the slaves.  Snelgrave unabashedly promotes himself as the rightful commander of the 
ship, but the Second Mate eventually wins the bid for control.  After Snelgrave’s repeated, 
condescending warnings to the Second Mate concerning his relaxed guard of the slaves, a 
rebellion breaks out.  Snelgrave sees his opportunity, quells the rebellion, takes control of the 
Elizabeth, and arranges for the public dismembering and execution of the slaves involved.75  
Snelgrave provides another example of the consequences of ship captains refusing his advice 
with his account of the Ferrers rebellion.  After disregarding Snelgrave’s advice, Captain 
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Messervy is killed by his slaves during a rebellion.  When near Jamaica, the slaves again 
attempted to mutiny (twice!), but were eventually sold.76   
 In all, Snelgrave’s accounts of the “several [mutinies] that have ended in a very tragical 
manner” had the potential to serve both as self-promotion as well as a gentle warning to his 
fellow traders and merchants.  Additionally, while Parliament focused on attempts to maximize 
profits by dealing with pirates, international European competition, and exerting influence over 
the duties imposed by African traders, personal accounts, like Snelgrave’s, take a starkly 
different stance, instead focusing on the ability to manage the slave population and prevent 
rebellion.  For Snelgrave, duties, European traders, and even pirates posed little threat to the 
slave trade regime when compared to the threat of slave mutiny.  To be sure, Snelgrave even 
refers to the Pirate Davis as a “generous friend.”77  While one should not confuse these 
sentiments with overall goodwill toward pirates (Snelgrave earlier notes that “next to murder & 
cruelty…nothing could make them more odious to the World, than their destroying…so many 
ships and cargoes”), Snelgrave clearly places the threat of slave shipboard insurrection on par 
with, or above, the threat posed by piracy. 78   
 Travels into the Inland Parts of Africa, a work by Francis Moore, geographer and writer 
for the RAC, offers a similar dynamic between threats posed by pirates, duties, Europeans, and 
slave shipboard insurrections.  Moore essentially writes to articulate the importance of 
government funding of RAC forts and castles in Africa to the continued well-being of the slave 
trade. Yet unlike other RAC writers, Moore takes account of slave shipboard insurrections.  On 
November 14th, 1730, for example, Moore notes that “about midnight our Ensign was called 
down by the Centinels, who were then on Duty, in order to prevent the Slaves from making their 
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Escape [from the Guinea], they having got an Iron Bar out of the Slave-House Window.”  On the 
following day, “the Ringleader of them being found out, and proving to be an old Offender, he 
was ordered one hundred Lashes .”  Additionally, on the 31st of December, the John and Anne 
was “seized by the Natives, for anchoring at the Port of Gillyfree, and not paying his Customs to 
the King of Barrah.”79  Then, on April 15th, 1732, after leaving Yanimarew, Moore heard tales of 
a “New England Scooner…cut off by the Natives,” at which time Captain Major was killed.80  
Finally, on February 5th, 1733, Captain Williams’ slaves rose, “killed a great Part of the Ship’s 
Crew; the Captain himself had his Fingers cut by them in a miserable Manner, and it was with 
great Difficulty he escaped being killed, which he did in swimming ashore, by which means he 
got safe to James Fort.”81  Travels into the Inland Parts of Africa, therefore, argues in favor of 
government funding to RAC castles and forts and uses instances of slave shipboard insurrection 
and attacks by coastal Africans as evidence.  What is more, by employing Moore, the RAC in 
some way sanctioned the use of such instances as evidence—an interesting decision, especially 
considering that fact that MPs (whom this work is no doubt directed towards) rarely, if ever, 
acknowledged these threats to the slave trade.  
 Finally, John Atkins echoes some of Snelgrave’s and Moore’s themes in A Voyage to 
Guinea, Brasil, and the West-Indies, published in 1737.  To begin, Atkins characterizes the 
relations between Europeans and Africans on the coast as one of “mutual distrust;” in fact, he 
duly notes the “foolishness in trusting Natives.”82  In Snelgravian fashion, Atkins explicitly 
warns captain and crew to “have a diligent Watch on their [slaves] Actions…to treat them with 
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all Gentleness and Civility.”83  In the case of the Dove, Atkins notes the commonplace 
occurrence of Panyarring, in which the natives “surprised and murdered a whole ship’s 
company.”84  To add, Atkins, like Snelgrave and Moore, leaves the reader with a grim reminder 
of the dangers of insurrection.  Atkins debunks the common assumption that “the Negroes 
Ignorance of Navigation will always be a safeguard,” warning instead that “there has not been 
wanting examples of rising and killing a Ship’s Company.”  Finally, Atkins concludes that “once 
or twice is enough to Shew, a Master’s Care and Dilligence should never be over till the 
delivery” of the slaves.85   
In short, Snelgrave, Moore, and Atkins provide their readers (from the London Merchants 
to MPs to everyday Britons) with astounding accounts of the danger associated with the slave 
trade.  In each example, the author provides both warnings and suggestions to prevent such acts 
violence.  Moreover, each characterizes the threats of insurrections and attacks from coastal 
Africans on par with the threats acknowledged by Parliament (Piracy, European competition, and 
African coastal duties).  In Moore’s case, the RAC implicitly sanctioned his use of insurrections 
and attacks by coastal Africans as evidence to support government funding of forts and castles.  
With these three examples in mind, popular publications regarding the slave trade tended to 
emphasize insurrections and attacks by coastal Africans as a central feature of the slave trade 
system. 
Periodicals and Slave Shipboard Insurrections 
The publications detailed above appealed to diverse audiences.  Snelgrave wrote for 
London Merchants.  Moore wrote for MPs and influential members of government.  Atkins, in 
all likelihood, wrote for both.  And while the ordinary Briton may occasionally stumble across 
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one of these three accounts, the main avenue for the acquisition of information about the slave 
trade was periodicals.  To be sure, periodicals published numerous accounts of slave shipboard 
insurrections—although not as numerous as accounts of piracy or international competition—and 
represent the most likely place for Britons to learn about such instances. 
Accounts of slave shipboard insurrections in periodicals often reached the level of detail 
apparent in published accounts of the slave trade; however, periodicals rarely presented the 
insightful discussions apparent in published accounts.  A typical newspaper account of a 
shipboard insurrection might be as short as the account of the Queen Caroline in the London 
Daily Post on September 15th, 1730: “Our Merchants receiv’d Advice, that the Ship Queen 
Caroline was lately lost of the Coast of Guinea.”86  On the other hand, as we shall see, some 
accounts could run for paragraphs, providing incredible narratives and succinct historical detail.  
Moreover, accounts of shipboard insurrections often appear not in one, but many different 
periodicals contemporaneously.  In the example of the Queen Caroline, editors of the Maryland 
Gazette received news of the revolt over a year before the London Daily Post printed theirs.  
Moreover, the Maryland Gazette’s account stands out from others due to the extraordinary level 
of detail it provides.  Readers of the Maryland Gazette, therefore, could read of the Grometto 
who betrayed Captain Halladay by persuading the “purchased Negroes to rise.”  When the slaves 
set out to take over the ship, “One [slave] took an Iron Bar out of the Fire-Hearth, with which he 
killed the Captain, and all the rest were soon murdered.”87  And while many Britons likely left 
the Maryland Gazette off their reading lists, the level of detail given to the revolt aboard the 
Queen Caroline speaks to the level of detail some periodicals provided for slave shipboard 
                                                 
86
 London Daily Post, September 15, 1730 (429). 
87
 Maryland Gazette, April 22, 1729 (85).  
Buckwalter 30 
insurrections.  Moreover, the dual accounts of the insurrection in both London and colonial 
periodicals speak to the “Atlantic” nature of some slave shipboard insurrections.  
An equally detailed account of shipboard insurrections appears in London’s Daily 
Journal on July 4, 1729.  After receiving a letter from aboard the Industry, the Daily Journal 
readily published the detailed account, which outlined the slaves’ plan “to rise upon the Ship’s 
[Martha] Crew.”  In order to do so, the slaves “made themselves Masters of Gunpowder, 
Muskets, Shot etc.”  Unfortunately for the slaves, the rebellion failed, and the female slave 
caught providing male slaves with weapons, being unfit for the market, was made an example of.  
The crew “hoisted her up to the Fore Yard Arm, in View of the other Slaves (who they had 
disarm’d) and fired half a Dozen Balls thro’ her Body; the last Shot that was fired cut the Rope 
which she was slung by, so that she tumbled…into the Sea at once.”  Naturally terrified, the 
remaining slaves arrived at Barbados without any major disturbances.88  Like most other 
accounts of shipboard insurrection in London’s papers, this account appears in not one, but many 
different periodicals, including the London Evening Post, the Weekly Journal, and the London 
Journal.89   
Like the Queen Caroline discussed above, the insurrection aboard the Martha was 
echoed throughout eighteenth-century periodicals in the Atlantic world.  On August 31, 1725, the 
Daily Journal broke the story, relaying that Captain Stephen Bull died on the way to Africa, 
possibly providing sufficient instability for the slaves taken on board later to formulate “a Design 
to surprise the Crew in the Night-Time.”  Although this plan was “timely discovered” by the 
crew, readers of the Daily Journal would be left with a strange feeling—the sense that the rigid 
racial hierarchy onboard slave ships might not be as rigid and previously thought.  Moreover, 
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this account was re-printed by the Weekly Journal, the London Journal, and the British Journal 
on September 4th and a similar account appeared in the Boston Gazette in November of that 
year.90  Similarly, news of the George resonated in London papers in early June, 1727.  The 
“unhappy Accident,” as the Daily Journal described it on June 10, 1727, involved slaves who 
“barbarously murdered all the Crew, except the Mate and a sailor, by knocking their Brains out 
with Billets.”  This particularly brutal insurrection, which left the two survivors badly wounded 
and the ship in a “leaky” condition, found itself printed in Parker’s Penny Post, the Daily Post, 
British Journal, Weekly Journal, and twice in the Daily Journal.91  With this in mind, it would be 
unlikely that a more-than-casual reader of periodicals in London could miss such a prolific story.  
The Queen Caroline and the Martha, however, only represent two of the many slave 
insurrections aboard British ships that found their ways into colonial newspapers.  The 
insurrection aboard the Ruby, for example, appeared in the New England Weekly Journal in 
March 1732.92  Similarly, the Dove, “was surprised by the Negroes they were trading with, who 
destroyed the ship, and murdered all her crew, except one of her mates,” an account of which 
appeared in the American Weekly Mercury in early 1733.93  Moreover, the interesting case of the 
Princess Caroline was printed in Boston in 1737.  Slaves aboard the ship “rose, and had 
possession of the ship three hours; but after a long engagement in which 20 of them were kill’d, 
the captain regain’d the Command of the Ship.”94  Not surprisingly, then, accounts of 
insurrections aboard colonial ships often reached London papers.  In October, 1730, an extract of 
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an affidavit of Peter Harlee, who served on the William of Boston, appeared in the Weekly 
Register.  In the affidavit, Harlee states that “the Negro Slaves rose, killed the master and eight 
men.”  In fact, Harlee was left alive with two boys in order to sail the ship back to Africa.  
Harlee, however, managed to gain the upper hand by feeding the slaves “Opium in Wine and 
Water, which put them to sleep.”  With the slaves asleep, Harlee signaled for help.  Captain 
Chapman of the Mary responded, the slaves were overrun and the leaders were executed.95  
Again, these various accounts show insurrections in a decidedly Atlantic light; Britons, both in 
Britain and its colonies, read about issues relating to slave shipboard insurrections.  Furthermore, 
given the “cumbrous and complex, loosely-knit, and frequently undependable” system of 
communication and reporting during the eighteenth-century, it is significant that some accounts 
of shipboard insurrection can be seen in both London and colonial papers.96  
One peculiar account found in the Universal Spectator in September 1729 allows us to 
examine the validity of periodical accounts of insurrections.  The Spectator affords the reader an 
account of an unknown ship cut off by “Negroes, and the said Master and all his Men eaten by 
them.”  The Spectator then concedes that the “person of credit” who provided the account “may 
have been mistaken in his Intelligence,” because “any Canibals, or Man-Eaters there…are up in 
the Country, and not on the Sea-Coast.”97  Such an appalling account calls into question the 
validity not only of this account, but of all accounts appearing in periodicals at the time.  There is 
no doubt that many details of these insurrections may be somewhat fabricated—the level of 
autonomy that individuals had over their stories by the lack of communication at sea almost 
ensures that such fabrications existed.  While these accounts surely reflected the biases of their 
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writers, they nonetheless discussed slave shipboard insurrections in periodicals read by ordinary 
Britons.  Historians K.W. Schweizer and M. Schumann buttress this point by noting “in whatever 
format,” writings of the press in the eighteenth-century were “generally considered a reputable 
source of information, eagerly pursued by king, nobleman, and commoners alike.”98  What is 
more, they appeared frequently enough that ordinary Britons would have some knowledge of 
insurrections and their relative frequency. 
Company Correspondence and Slave Shipboard Insurrections 
While published accounts of the slave trade and periodicals often featured discussions of 
slave shipboard insurrections, the RAC and SSC, in their official papers, dealt with insurrections 
on a much more implicit level.  If, for the purpose of this argument, we envision British slave 
trading society as a hierarchy with those directly involved with the slave trade (captains, crew, 
etc.) at the bottom, government-affiliated companies (the RAC and SSC) in the middle, and MPs 
and government officials at the top, those nearer the bottom acknowledged slave shipboard 
insurrections far more often than those nearer the top.  In layman’s terms, insurrections deeply 
troubled captains and seamen enough to lead them to publish their accounts or send news of 
insurrections to London and colonial periodicals.  Moreover, the RAC and SSC, while concerned 
with insurrections, discussed them much less explicitly.  Likewise, MPs rarely acknowledged 
these incidents. 
Instructions to slave ship captains often provided a useful arena to discuss insurrections; 
to be sure, many RAC letters of instruction hinted at the possibility of insurrection.  Instructions 
to the captain of the Oxford in March, 1712, emphasized the secure placement of the ship’s 
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gunpowder, as well as advised the captain to “take good care of the Negroes.”99  From these two 
suggestions, one might be able to logically infer that RAC officials feared someone, crew or 
slave, breaking into the ship’s armaments and using them for ill.  Moreover, humane treatment of 
slaves serves the dual purposes of ensuring that slave would be sold and guaranteeing the safety 
of the crew.  One year later, in instructions to the captain of the Joanna, RAC officials cautioned 
the captain to “always keep a good guard both at sea and in port to prevent surprise.”100  Once 
again, RAC officials fell short of explicitly discussing a slave rebellion, yet their warnings infer 
that the RAC considered slave insurrections a pressing issue.  A month later, in April 1713, RAC 
officials again warned Captain Samuel Foot to take good care of his slaves, however, this time 
they added that, “the neglect of which has sometimes occasioned a great mortality amongst the 
negroes to the utter ruin of the voyage.”101  Moreover, instructions to the Royal Anne reminded 
the captain to “show a good example of piety, sobriety, and virtue.”102  More explicitly, Pindar 
Galley records evidence that RAC officials counseled the captain to keep “a watchfull eye over 
the negroes you receive on board that they do not want anything and be prevented from doing 
any mischief.”103   
Broadly, RAC instructions to their captains seemed to follow a loose pattern from 1704 
to around 1720, which often included individualized warnings to captains of the dangers of the 
voyage.  The cases of the Oxford, Joanna, Royal Anne, and Pindar Galley, documented above, 
represent examples of these; each captain was warned about various dangers, most notably 
ensuring the docility of their crew and slaves.  Around 1720, however, ship instructions begin to 
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follow a much stricter pattern.  In fact, many instructions, including the instructions to Charles 
Lansdell of the Lady Rachell, are not fully copied into the RAC record books.104  Instead, they 
were abbreviated, suggesting that by this time, the RAC began to formalize its records.  Further 
evidence of this increased formality comes in the form of an outline for all instructions at the 
beginning of RAC record books.  After 1720, RAC instructions all began to follow this outline 
more strictly.  Additional changes following this increased formality include an increased focus 
on documentation of the ship’s progress.  For example, the RAC initiated a requirement to 
captains to “take notice of all Negroes…on board your ship.”  Moreover, the captain was 
required to gather as many officers as possible to “number them [slaves], and enter every such 
number, with their quality, into the book.”105  Officers, too, were required to sign the book to 
ensure its validity.  The RAC additionally required all captains to “render Us an account in 
writing of every particular taken on board your ship,” and “within ten days after you return and 
arrival in the River Thames you are to deliver this book to the Sub Governor or Deputy 
Governor.”106  In short, the increased formalization of RAC instructions focused more energy on 
the documentation of events of the voyage.  With this in mind, the RAC, in implicitly warning its 
captains of insurrections and requiring draconian documentation of their voyages, surely had 
significant knowledge of slave shipboard insurrections.  Yet despite this, the RAC and SSC 
rarely, if ever, mentioned insurrections explicitly in their correspondence with factors and agents 
in the Atlantic world.   
 An examination of the RAC’s Committee of Correspondence records provides further 
evidence of the RAC’s implicit concern for slave insurrections and attacks by coastal Africans.  
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For example, in September 1713, the RAC sent Captain William Cooke to Gambia fort in order 
to “give security.”  Additionally, thirty-two individuals were sent with him, thirteen of which 
were soldiers, representing the largest single group that was sent.107  Nearly two years later, the 
RAC agreed to “Draught of a petition to her Majesty for some Naval Force to be sent to 
Africa.”108  Moreover, an additional regiment of individuals was sent to Cape Coast Castle in 
February, 1716; once again, the largest portion of the sixty-eight men sent was a group of 
twenty-five soldiers.109  To be sure, soldiers played an integral part of preserving order at RAC 
forts and castles.  Of the nine salaried staff at Dixiecove, five were soldiers, a ratio which 
appears to be close to the norm.  While the larger forts generally housed less military personnel 
as a proportion of total Europeans, the average fort had a military/non-military personnel ratio of 
67:100 as of August, 1723.110    
 Despite the RAC’s implicit acknowledgment of slave shipboard insurrections and attacks 
by coastal Africans, some evidence of reported insurrections appears in RAC letters.  On the 30th 
of September, 1721, factors at Cape Coast Castle wrote to the RAC in London, telling of “the 
night the Slaves took the opportunity of the Capt. Being on Shoar and the People’s Negligence to 
rise upon them.”  The slaves killed one man and a boy, but managed to take control of the vessel 
and run it ashore.  Captain Wilson, being on shore, “procured the assistance of the Towns 
People,” who aided him in re-capturing some of the slaves.  In all, ten were re-captured while the 
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others fled to freedom.111  In other words, the RAC had at least some knowledge of slave 
shipboard insurrections on board their ships—knowledge that would not translate into explicit 
RAC, or governmental, concern. 
 Rather than establishing explicit concern for shipboard insurrections, the RAC, like 
Parliament, focused much of its efforts on eliminating or containing the disastrous effects of 
Piracy, European competition, and coastal duties.  While instructing the captain of the Oxford, 
the RAC noted that pirates “frequently infest the Coast of Africa.”112  To add, when factors 
requested an additional man of war patrolling the coast of Africa, they cited a need to protect 
English forts and ships from “pirates on the coast.”113  James Phipps and John Stevenson, both 
factors of the RAC, passed on the sentiments of a Mr. Baille, who “complains of the decay of 
Trade on that Coast by reason of the Pyrates,” to the RAC in London.114  Moreover, on January 
25th, 1721, the RAC’s Committee of Trade and Correspondence took account of “the loss upon 
the Onslow,” which was captured by Pirates.  The Committee of Trade and Correspondence also 
resolved to notify the “Offices of Insurance and That M. Neal & Mr. Lockwood be desired to 
settle that Affair.”115  The next year, the same committee considered Captain Stoakes’ (of the 
Guinea Sloop) “Sufferings when taken by the Pirates.”  The committee likewise provided 
Stoakes with ₤50, in order to “account of his Wages to Equip himself for his Voyage.”116  The 
SSC engaged in similar actions regarding damages to its ships by pirates.  On November 20th, 
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1717, the SSC declared that it was “not chargeable with Freight for the Twenty Eight negroes 
taken out of the Royal Africa Captn. Foott by the Pyrates.”117   
 Additionally, on the twenty-third of August, 1723, the RAC suggested that the Governor 
and Council near Cabenda “put the best Construction they can upon the misfortune which befell 
the King’s Son who was taken by the Pirates.”  Moreover, RAC advised the Governor to assure 
the African King that the “Company are very much Concern’d” with the threat of piracy.118  In 
May of that year, the Committee of Trade resolved “some Acknowledgment Should be made by 
the Company to Mr. Ogle & Capt. Herdman for the Service they did upon the Coast in regard to 
the Pirates.”119  In other words, the RAC spent considerable efforts attempting to control the 
effects of piracy on the slave trade in the absence of explicitly tackling the problems posed by 
slave shipboard insurrections. 
 European competition, too, played a large role in the RAC’s efforts to maximize the slave 
trade.  Instructions to William Parr in March, 1715 requested that he become informed on the 
“pretensions of the French to the sole Trade of Portodally.”120  Additional enquiries into the trade 
at Portodally were made on February 28, 1715, when the Committee of Trade sought to debunk 
the French claims of the “sole right to trade” in the region.121  The threat of the French involved 
far more serious consequences.  In late July, 1714, the Committee of Correspondence 
investigated accounts of the “ships & effects of this Company which were taken by the French in 
and about the River Gambia,” and resolved to “make a charge for the ships & effects and of her 
losses the Company sustain’d.”122  The RAC additionally instructed Martin Bladen, newly 
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appointed Commissary to His Majesty, “to procure Satisfaction” for the “considerable Damages 
by the Depredations made by the French in time of peace.”123   
 The Dutch and Spanish presented similar threats to the RAC and the slave trade as a 
whole.  In 1722, the Committee of Trade and Correspondence ordered that affidavits be taken for 
men aboard the ship Unity, which was “taken by the Spanish Privateer.”  Two years later, the 
RAC’s Committee of Trade wrote to the SSC enquiring “in relation to the Negroes taken in July 
1722 in the Ship Unity by a Spanish Guard de Costa.”124  The same committee, in 1721, 
discussed “part of the letter from Cape Coast Castle of the 8th April last,” which disclosed a 
description of a Dutch ship “seizing…the Hanibal & Dispatch, two of the Comp. Ships.”125  With 
this in mind, piracy and European competition concerned the RAC to a considerable degree and 
may help to explain the near absence of explicit discussions of slave shipboard insurrections. 
British Government and Slave Shipboard Insurrections 
 Like the RAC’s peculiar relationship with slave shipboard insurrections, the British 
Government rarely discussed these numerous and destructive incidents.  In some sense, this 
should not be a surprise.  In fact, Christopher L. Brown asserts that “From 1713-1787, when the 
British slave trade reached its apex, the traffic in African captives only rarely became the subject 
of sustained discussion in parliament.”126  However, Brown’s article considers the slave trade as 
a whole, and concedes a number of exceptions to this rule.  To be sure, while our period (1713-
1743) revealed no sustained enquires into the method of trading slaves (which had previously 
been the major subject for contention), the British Government, including parliament, exerted 
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considerable energy toward addressing threats to the slave trade.  By and large, these included 
piracy, European competition, and, possibly as an extension of the previous two, funding for the 
support and maintenance of British establishments on the coast of Africa.  With this in mind, the 
government’s systematic failure to address slave shipboard insurrections, which impacted the 
profits of the slave trade on a massive scale, is very peculiar indeed. 
 Maintenance of forts and establishments in Africa and the West Indies provided the most 
common and direct avenue for the British Government to address the slave trade.  On March 9, 
1714, for example, the Colonial Office petitioned Lord Bolingbroke for continued support for the 
fort at Port Royal (in the amount of ₤100,000), citing its importance “for the security and defence 
by H.M. ships, of the Island, and the trade thereof.”127  Similarly, the Board of Trade informed 
the Colonial Office in March, 1726 that at the present time, “Forts and Settlements…are not 
capable of protecting the ships of your Majesty’s subjects,” thereby establishing a grave need for 
government funding.128  Two months later, a Captain “Snelgrove” (possibly the William 
Snelgrave discussed earlier) addressed the Board of Trade and Plantations, asserting that the 
“present forts and settlements” remained in “bad condition,” to the “great disadvantages” of the 
slave trade.129  A few days earlier, a Captain Bonhan testified to the “mean condition of the 
forts.”130   
 Similarly, the House of Commons (“HOC”) discussed issues relating to forts and 
establishments.  On March 5, 1729, the HOC requested an account of the condition of the 
various forts and castles on the coast of Africa.  Five days later the House received an account of 
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the quantity and names of individuals employed at the African establishments.  In February of 
the next year, the Commons requested an estimate for the maintenance and defense of the 
African forts, a request they repeatedly made in subsequent years. 131  Moreover, in February, 
1743, the HOC estimated that during the 1730s such costs averaged around ₤12,000 per year.132  
 One of the main reasons for concern over the establishment and continued maintenance 
of forts and establishments—aside from the RAC’s attempts to stop hemorrhaging money—was 
the incessant attacks by pirates on slave ships, especially before 1726.  In concordance with this, 
the secretary of the Colonial Office appealed for “one or more of H.M. ships” in order to protect 
Jamaica from “the great number of pirates that do at present infest those seas.”133  The Board of 
Trade and Plantations, in an attempt to ascertain the number of ships needed to protect the 
African coast from pirates in October, 1716, asked Mr. Pierce and Mr. Benson of the RAC for 
their opinions.  They responded, calling for six ships (costing between ₤40,000 and ₤50,000), to 
protect against “Sallee Rovers from whom the Company's ships might be in danger” and “several 
pirates on the coast of Africa.”134  Ten years later, a captain advised the Board of Trade and 
Plantations that “ships of war will be the only proper and effectual protection to the trade.”135   
 Likewise, the House of Lords chimed in on the issue of piracy in 1720, discussing a bill 
that would make the recent act of “effectual” suppression of piracy perpetual.136  Further bills for 
suppressing piracy were introduced in the Commons in March, 1728.137  Additionally, the 
Commons received several petitions, memorials, and representations claiming abuse from pirates 
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on February 20, 1717.  Five days later, the HOC again discussed the “methods for suppressing 
pirates.”  Then, on the 27th, Mr. Chetwynde of the Lords Commissioners of Trade and 
Plantations presented his relevant papers concerning piracy.138  Four years later a petition from 
numerous merchants argued that “Pirates do increase, and gather strength daily.”  The merchants 
even claimed that the “British trade has already sustained greater losses by the said Pirates than 
were suffered during the late French wars.”139  In response to these unending pleas for assistance, 
the Commons frequently sent instructions to ships of war “as they relate to their protecting of His 
Majesty’s Subjects for cruising against pirates.”140  While this appears an exhausting list, the 
point remains, the government dealt with issues of piracy and its effects on the slave trade on 
fairly consistent basis.   
 And if incessant pirate attacks were not enough to grasp the government’s attention, 
European competition—mainly through acts of privateering—would.  On March 6, 1731, the 
House of Commons called in numerous merchants to consider their losses at the hands of the 
Spanish.  Richard Copithorne, owner and Captain of the Betty, related his story to his fellow 
countrymen in a plea for assistance.  On June 29, 1727, the Betty was “attacked by a Spanish 
Privateer under Turkish Colours.”  The privateer, according to Copithorne, “charged him with 
his whole Fire,” beginning a violent battle for control of the ship.  After five hours of fighting, 
Copithorne watched his deck “blow up,” before he was carried off to the privateer ship.141  One 
of the more extreme cases of “Spanish Depredations,” the case of the Betty had significant 
implications for those engaged in the slave trade.  More specifically, cases like the Betty 
provided merchants with apparitions of the dangers of the slave trade. 
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 A month before the Commons considered the Betty, Bristol merchants sent a petition 
“complaining of the Spanish depredations.”  Moreover, Liverpool merchants seconded that 
notion later that month, sending their own complaints on February 25th, 1731.  The Commons 
likewise considered both petitions the day before discussing the Betty, calling for a letter to the 
King requesting a continuance of “his Endeavours to prevent the Depredations of the Spaniards 
for the future.” 142  Continuing in this manner, the Commons contemplated a petition from the 
Ann Galley relating to the “unjust capture and seizure of their ship…and her cargo by the 
Spanish.”  Moreover, the Commons considered complaints of the seizure and detention of the 
Scipio by the Spanish.143  Once again, the Commons responded to these complaints and others by 
relating them to the King in a series of “humble Addresses.” 144 
 The Board of Trade and Plantations dealt with similar issues.  On November 24th, 1715, 
four members of the RAC addressed the Board, maintaining that “their trade was in great 
danger…from French and Dutch rivals.”145  Likewise, in December of that year, the Board read a 
letter from Mr. Harris “relating to the sending any of His Majesty's ships to the coast of Africa.”  
In the letter, Harris posits that “the assistance of a ship of war was necessary to preserve the 
interests of the Company there.”146  Similarly, the RAC sent Mr. Hopegood and others to the 
Board of Trade and Plantations in August, 1719 to inform the Board of “the ships taken from 
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them by the French in the time of peace.”147  With this in mind, merchants and RAC officials 
alike continuously pestered the Commons and the Board of Trade for assistance in dealing with 
European competition regarding the slave trade. 
 While piracy and European competition presented formidable threats to the slave trade, 
the government occasionally recognized other threats, including natural disaster, shipwreck, 
desertion, and, in one instance, mutiny.  Dealing with shipwreck, the Commons received a 
petition for a bill for a “more effectual” recovery of ships and goods destroyed or driven ashore 
by “distress of weather.”148  Similarly, the Commons took measures to prevent seamen from 
deserting merchant ships on the coast of Africa, while, at the same time, attempted to thwart 
mariners’ engaging in “private service” or taking any “craft” belonging to any merchant ship.149  
In other words, parliament sought to curb the hemorrhaging of both men and goods from slave 
ships.  In fact, the House of Lords in 1717 announced a bill to make perpetual an act that called 
for the “preservation of all such ships and goods which shall happen to be found on shore, or 
stranded,” in parts of the empire.150  Apparently, the government was concerned about the 
profitability of the trade so much so that they would resort to discussing and codifying bills 
aimed at scavenging stranded ships, both British and non-British.  Finally, in one instance the 
House of Lords addressed ship mutinies—although whether the Lords directed this proviso 
toward slave insurrections or seamen mutinies is unclear.  The specific proviso was added by the 
Earl of Clarendon to the act mentioned above in 1717 and called for anyone “who shall willingly 
destroy” a ship to be sentenced to death.151  In sum, the British Government exhibited a strong 
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interest in addressing threats to the profitability of the slave trade.  The Commons, Lords, and 
various committees and offices of the government directed their efforts toward suppressing 
piracy, securing reparations from the Spanish and French, and providing enough funding to 
adequately maintain African and West Indian forts to prevent attacks from the former.  In all, 
every significant hazard to the slave trade with the exception of slave shipboard insurrections 
were directly and continuously confronted by the British Government.   
Conclusions 
As we have seen, slave shipboard insurrections played a fundamental role in the British 
slave trade.  Because insurrections and other acts of African resistance endangered the success of 
individual voyages, ship captains and mariners found the prevention of such acts the key to 
continued safety and success of the slave trade.  London and colonial papers, too, frequently 
printed accounts—often in great detail—of slave shipboard insurrection.  Thus, those directly 
involved in the slave trade and occasional readers of periodicals in London and colonial port 
cities would not have been surprised by encountering descriptions of revolt.  Others involved in 
the slave trade, such as factors and agents of the Royal African Company, recognized slave 
shipboard insurrections as well.  Accounts by factors and agents of the RAC, however, occur 
much less often.  Moving upward through the social hierarchy, influential members of the RAC 
rarely addressed insurrections explicitly.  Nevertheless, the RAC implicitly acknowledged the 
need to protect against insurrections by frequently requesting assistance from the Royal Navy in 
defending their forts and settlements.  Furthermore, ship captains could read between the lines of 
instructions from the RAC and infer that preventing a slave rebellion would be central to the 
success of their voyage.  Like the top echelons of the RAC, government circles rarely—if ever—
took notice of slave shipboard insurrections.  Paradoxically, parliament and the various boards 
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and committees spent inestimable amounts of time dealing with piracy, European competition, 
and funding RAC forts and settlements—all of which posed threats to the profitability of the 
burgeoning slave trade.   
 The question thus remains: Why did the British government fail to recognize slave 
shipboard insurrections as a formidable threat to the well-being of the slave trade?  While this 
question may be easily posed, answering it is problematic.  To be sure, research may never 
uncover the true motives of those individuals involved with governmental decisions in the early 
eighteenth-century; but research can uncover the possible factors at play. 
 In all, a few essential conclusions may be derived from the evidence.  First, one may 
conclude that the government simply had insufficient time to tackle the issue of slave shipboard 
insurrections because they were bombarded with other issues relating to the slave trade.  In 1996, 
historian Joseph Inikori estimated that hazards to the slave trade fit into three categories: natural 
hazards, insurrections and battles with Africans, and conflicts with Europeans during war.  In all, 
Inikori approximates that 65% of lost voyages occurred at the hands of Europeans, while roughly 
18% at the hands of natural causes, leaving the remaining 18% to be the fault of slave 
insurrections and attacks by coastal Africans. 152  While it is understandable that the government 
might focus its efforts on European attacks, it nonetheless fails to explain why they ignored 
events that put into jeopardy the success of nearly one-fifth of slave trading voyages.   
 Moreover, the efforts of the government and Royal Navy to eradicate piracy in the 
immediate post-war years (1716-1726) are well known.  While Peter Earle criticizes the 
government’s floundering efforts to eradicate pirates in the late-1710s, he acknowledges that the 
increased efforts in the 1720s—along with the self-destructive nature of pirates and the shift in 
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public opinion—account for their eventual demise.153  Likewise, Marcus Rediker, in Villains of 
all Nations, recognizes the efforts of the British government by noting that the increased 
violence of piracy and anti-piracy campaigns led to piracy’s destruction.154  In all, the decade of 
1716-1726, and the flurry of pirate-led attacks on British slave ships that occurred during these 
years, absorbed much of the government’s time.   
 Furthermore, concern for European attacks continued, if not increased, following the 
eradication of most Atlantic pirates in 1726, providing yet another distraction from slave 
shipboard insurrections.  In the 1730s, as well, landed rebellions in the West Indies, most notably 
in Jamaica, Antigua, St. Johns, and Virginia deeply troubled the government.  In March, 1736, 
the Grub Street Journal reported a letter from Antigua, which was under attack from revolting 
slaves.  In it, the author reports that, “we are in a great deal of trouble in this island,” citing the 
“burning of Negroes…takes up almost all our time.”155  Moreover, the Universal Spectator 
reported that on July 10, 1730, of an “insurrection of the Negroes about Williamsburg 
[Virginia].”156  The government thus responded to calls from London periodicals and colonial 
officials regarding landed insurrections.  In July, 1730, for example, the Calendar of State 
Papers Colonial notes the movements of “Capt. Soaper and Tho. Ascroft” and their attempts to 
quell the rebellion of runaway slaves in Jamaica.  The Colonial Office, likewise, heard numerous 
tales of bloody skirmishes between British colonial forces and Maroon communities, including 
one in which “negros that lay in ambush” fired upon Captain Soaper, prompting a call for retreat.  
These accounts resulted in numerous calls on MPs to initiate acts “for the better suppressing and 
reducing the rebellious and runaway negroes .”  To be sure, “many depredations and violencys 
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committed upon the frontier settlements,” felt the Colonial Office, led to the “great 
discouragement of new settlers.”157  In other words, the government considered landed 
rebellions, which had a greater likelihood of spreading and destroying the colonial system than 
rebellion on board isolated ships, and European attacks in the 1730s to be more important than 
slave shipboard insurrections.   
 While this conclusion, that sundry issues sufficiently burdened the government during the 
early eighteenth-century to divert attention away from slave shipboard insurrections, has its 
merits, it not only fails to explain the complete lack of discussion for shipboard insurrections but 
overstates what may simply be an effect of the lack of discussion, not a cause.  In other words, it 
is unclear whether the lack of discussion of slave shipboard insurrections allowed additional time 
for the discussion of the other threats to the slave trade, or vice versa.   
 The more cynical, the more pessimistic conclusion to be drawn from the paradox holds 
that government officials avoided acknowledging shipboard insurrections because 
acknowledging such acts would, in effect, concede that there were a significant and active 
“resistance movement,” against the slave trade.  In other words, resistance to the British slave 
trade by pirates and other Europeans would not pose a moral threat to the slave trade because 
pirates and Europeans were motivated by self-interest and profit.  Resistance from the victims of 
the slave trade, however, might be seen as an enquiry into the morality of the slave trade.158  
While this thesis seems alluring, it is significantly flawed.  For example, the complete omission 
of slave shipboard insurrections would have required an unattainable conspiracy with the 
compliance of numerous individuals.  Moreover, the government’s significant discussion of 
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slave resistance in the West Indies counteracts, in some way, this thesis.  Presumably, 
explanations for slave rebellions in the new world (which include the uncivilized heathen nature 
of the slave) could simply be superimposed as a justification of shipboard insurrections.  
Officials, therefore, would be able to discuss and help prevent slave shipboard insurrections 
without widespread moral enquiry into the slave trade.   
 Finally, the nature of British society, its conception of race, and its relationship with the 
slave trade help provide yet another conclusion.  In Moral Capital, Christopher L.Brown 
characterizes the sudden indignation toward the slave trade by Britons in the second half of the 
eighteenth-century as a “decision to act” on a previously held conception of slavery as 
“abhorrent.”159  While the failure to pinpoint the stimulus for this decision represents one of the 
limitations of Moral Capital, the stimulus that led individuals to question the morality of the 
slave trade—whatever it may be— may help us make sense the government’s lack of discussion 
about slave shipboard insurrections earlier in the century.160  Put another way, the government’s 
failure to discuss slave shipboard insurrections (and the public’s failure to question the morality 
of the slave trade in the face of numerous accounts of slave resistance) reflects Britons’ 
relationship with the slave trade at the time, which was one of perceived moral injustice, yet 
reluctant acceptance of the system.   
 Lynn Hunt, author of Inventing Human Rights, provides yet another hint as to the factors 
underlying this paradox—and possibly a solution to the limitations of Moral Capital.  Hunt 
ultimately concludes that a new sense of “empathy” developed in the mid-18th century, one that 
fostered from increasing connections between various groups of inherently different people.  
Novels played an integral role in this transformation by making “the point that all people are 
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fundamentally similar because of their inner feelings.”161  Moreover, it was not until the 1760s 
that human rights—derived from this feeling of similarity to other humans—and “new attitudes 
about both torture and humane punishment first crystallized.”162  For the purposes of this study, 
these assertions carry enormous weight.  They hint that in the early 18th century, Britons may not 
have held the capacity (which ultimately could be acquired over time with a new definition and 
meaning of “empathy”) to feel the equivalent to today’s definition of “empathy.”  This means 
that individuals who ran operations in London, without significant interactions with Africans and 
with a definition of “empathy” that inherently excluded Africans, were unable to see actions 
made by Africans during the middle passage as individual actions legitimized through the 
common link of humanity.  In fact, revolting Africans were not seen as individuals at all.  
Furthermore, members of the government and the RAC would not have equivocated revolting 
Africans with a moral challenge to their economic system.  Neither grand conspiracy nor moral 
enquiry, it seems, could have occurred. 
 Considering the hierarchical levels of concern for shipboard insurrections and Lynn 
Hunt’s assertions concerning the British mindset and “human rights” issues, it is clear that this 
system arose from the inability of individuals (absent from direct contact with Africans) to 
connect acts of resistance with a moral challenge to the slave trade.  Had they been able to do so, 
they could have either conspired to explicitly ignore these actions or they could have acted to 
reform their injustices.  To the 21st century observer, these two choices appear the only viable 
options.  Without a new meaning of “empathy,” however, early 18th century government officials 
likely failed to characterize acts of resistance as a moral challenge—a connection they would 
make later in the century—and therefore, failed to both conspire against or reform to 
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accommodate acts of African resistance.  Thus, government officials continued to ignore—
although not knowingly—acts of resistance in the middle passage until new definitions of 
empathy took hold of the popular consciousness, demanding an encompassing moral inquiry into 
the slave trade.  
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